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Abstract 
There is a perception that internal audit units (IAUs) in private and public sector organisations cannot be 
independent in executing their functions because the personnel of the units are on the one hand 
employees of their organisations and on the other hand expected to provide assurance services to 
management professionally. Such an outlook has the tendency to impair the credibility of IAUs as well 
as the professionalism of the IAU. This exploratory study examined the independence in appearance of 
the IAUs in selected Ghanaian polytechnics within the framework of organisational status of the IAUs, 
reporting line of the IAU and the power conferred on the Ghanaian public sector audit committee (AC) 
to ensure independence. Data was collected from the Directors of Audit (DOA) using a survey method. 
Results of the study suggest that the IAUs in Ghanaian polytechnics are largely independent in 
appearance. However, the study suggests that the Ghanaian AC has only an audit report implementation 
responsibility in reference to the enabling parliamentary act. The paper contributes to the auditing 
literature by providing some insights into the concept of auditor independence in public sector 
organisations within the context of national legislation and international best practice in the auditing 
profession.   
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The call by corporate entities, professional bodies and academic researchers for the internal audit units (IAUs) to 
improve their audit capability increased globally following the corporate scandal of Enron and other reputed business 
organisations. In an attempt to salvage the situation, diverse legislations and regulations have emerged to give the 
IAU prominence in the corporate governance process.   
To this end, the role and scope of the Internal Audit Unit (IAU) is evolving to meet the demands of the changing 
business environment and its diverse stakeholder needs so as to achieve and promote better corporate governance. 
The IAU is currently expected to provide an independent assurance and consulting services to management to 
evaluate an institution’s risk management, internal control system, corporate governance processes to ensure that 
they are adequate and functioning properly and simultaneously ensuring proper safeguarding of assets, preventing 
and the detection of fraud and errors (The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 2004; Carcello et al., 2005; Aikins, 
2011).  
It is therefore not surprising that the IAU has been identified as one of the pillars of good corporate governance 
that complements the board of directors, audit committees and external auditors (Anderson et al., 1993) globally. 
Essentially, good corporate governance will be incomplete without the IAU. Not only is the IAU an essential pillar of 
the corporate governance structure but also an indispensable unit as it has a most profound knowledge of happenings 
in the organizational setting (Cohen and Sayag, 2010; IIA, 2012).  
The establishment and conduct of the IAUs in the private companies and firms is not required by statute or 
regulation however they are required as way of best practice. Their establishment and conduct in the public 
companies and the public sector is required by statute and regulations (Godwin, 2004; Sterck and Bouckaert, 2006).  
For instance, in the United States of America (USA), the SOX (2002) regulates public companies while in the 
United Kingom (UK), the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Turnbull report regulate public companies. To 
strengthen corporate governance in the Ghanaian public sector administration, various legislations have been passed 
since independence to regulate the conduct of the internal audit. Currently, among the legislations are the 1992 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, The Audit Service Act, 2000, (Act 584), the Internal Audit Agency Act, 
2003, (Act 658), the Public Procurement Act, (Act 663) and the Financial Administration Act, (Act 654).  Whether in 
the public sector, public or private companies, the IAUs provide assurance services to multiple stakeholders. The 
assurance services of the IAUs have credibility when they demonstrate an appearance of being independent from 
management. The usefulness of this quality in IAUs operations has resulted in the formulation of legislations, 
guidelines, code of ethics and standards demanding that IAUs must be independent and objective in their outlook 
(SOX, 2002; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 2010; International Ethics Standards 
Board for Accountants (IESBA), 2010). 
Research evidence has demonstrated that the independence of the IAU is best complemented by the 
organizational status, reporting levels and the existence of an audit committee (Ahmad et al., 2009; Cohen and 
Sayag, 2010). It can therefore be envisaged that there may be threats to the independence of the IAUs in the absence 
of an independent AC in an organization. A survey by the Global Internal Audit Common Body of Knowledge 
(CBOK, 2015) the world’s largest ongoing study of the internal audit profession, in 2015, revealed that only an 
average 67% of public sector organisations have audit committees compared to 83% in the non-public sector 
organisations.  
The IAUs are increasingly playing an important role in the judicious use of resources in the public sector 
(Theofanis et al., 2011). They however thread a very slippery path in corporate governance practice because on the 
one hand they provide assurance services to management and on the other hand provide consultancy services to 
management as professionals (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006). The IAUs is expected to advise management in their 
consultancy service and are equally expected to independently assess management. Notwithstanding the fact that 
internal auditors are employees of the organisations within which they work, they are to report on the adequacy of 
internal controls as a contribution to the proper, economic, efficient and effective use of resources. As a result of this 
dual role, there are questions as to whether the IAUs as part of the group of employee of an organisation can be truly 
independent of management influence and report events in a true and fair manner (Richard and Jordan, 2000; Van 
Peursem, 2005; Paape, 2007).  
To the best knowledge of the researchers, almost two decades after the establishment of the polytechnics in 
Ghana, there is no empirical research conducted to examine the independence of the IAU in Ghanaian polytechnics 
as public sector organisations. The primary objective of this paper is to examine the independence in appearance of 
the IAU in Ghanaian polytechnics. This independence in appearance will be examined within the framework of 
organisational status of the IAUs, reporting line to the board of directors and the powers of the audit committee in 
Ghanaian public sector organisations.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Auditor independence is important because it has an influence on audit quality. The IAUs are regarded as an 
integral component of corporate governance practice and are expected to provide assurance and consulting services 
(Christopher et al., 2009). The IAUs threads a very slippery path in corporate governance practice in an attempt to be 
independent because on the one hand they provide assurance services to management and on the other hand they 
provide consultancy services to management as professionals (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006). Attempts have been 
made to explain and define the concept of independence. An observation made by regulators and professional bodies 
alike is that the word cannot be explained nor defined in isolation (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004). There is 
independence in mind and independence in appearance. Regulators and research academicians have largely come to 
an understanding that independence in mind relates to one’s state of mind and is not easy to prove. Whittington and 
Pany (2004) concluded that auditor independence is relative and not absolute as it depends on the context. Fearnley 
and Beattie (2004) summarized definitions of auditor independence from the perspective of various regulators from 
the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and the European Commission. All the individual definitions by these regulators 







clearly distinguished between independence in fact and independence in appearance. Independence in fact is 
perceived as a mental state and objectivity of the auditor and is not easily subject to proof. DeAngelo (1981) 
remarked that auditor independence is ‘the conditional probability of reporting a discovered breach’ and this position 
appears to be inclined more to the mental disposition of the auditor as an individual in being objective and explains 
the concept of independence in fact. The common understanding shared by the framework regulators about 
independence in appearance is that the auditor should avoid situations where a reasonable and informed third party 
would suspect the objectivity of the auditor. Hence, one can reasonably conclude that whereas independence in fact 
appears to be covert, independence in appearance is overt and subject to some level verifiability without much 
difficulty. The IIA (1999) defined the independence of the internal auditor as “The freedom from conditions that 
threaten objectivity or the appearance of objectivity. Such threats to objectivity must be managed at the individual 
auditor, engagement, functional and organisational levels”. Without the concept of independence, the audit 
activities and the audit report will lose their value of reliance and credibility. Research evidence has demonstrated 
that the assurance services provided by the auditor will lose their value of reliance and credibility if not for the 
concept of auditor independence (Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).  
According to IIA (2012) organisational independence allows the audit function to conduct work without 
interference by the entity under audit. The organizational position of the IAUs can affect its independence in 
appearance Cohen and Sayag (2010). To achieve organisational independence, international best practices demand 
that the IAU should be positioned within the organisational structure to enable the head of the IAUs, the chief audit 
executive (CAE), report to a level that allows it to fulfill its responsibilities (IIA, 2004). Attribute standard (AS) 1110 
of the International Standards for the Professional Practice (ISPP) of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004) prescribes that the 
chief audit executive (CAE) should report to a level within the organization that allows the IAUs to fulfill their 
responsibilities. Research results suggest that the organisational status of IAUs is critical in enabling the function to 
achieve its responsibilities (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006; Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010). Godwin (2004) 
conducted a study on the similarities and differences between public sector and private sector internal auditing and 
confirmed that public sector internal auditors report to higher levels compared to private sector internal auditors.  To 
further enhance the organizational independence of the IAU, Practice Advisory 1000-1 of the International 
Professional Practices Framework (IPPF), captioned purpose, authority and responsibility, stipulates that the purpose, 
authority and responsibility of the IAU should be defined in an internal audit charter (IIA, 2009). Consequently, the 
IAUs are empowered to be independent in their operations when the board of directors (BOD) or its equivalent 
agency approves the internal audit charter. Research has demonstrated that the consequence of an approved internal 
audit charter in organisations is an added source of authority that strengthens the organisational independence of the 
IAUs (Van Peursem, 2005). In a comparative study between Germany and China concluded that the IAUs be set up 
without interference and influence from other departments and should be structured in such a way that it is only 
under the BOD or by inference the AC which is the functional arm representing the board of directors. 
The availability of appropriate legislative instrument also gives the IAU the legal mandate and anchorage to be 
established to conduct its audit without apprehension and enhances the independence of the IAU (IIA, 2012). The 
independence of the IAU in the public sector is most effective when there is the legal requirement for the 
establishment of IAU among other factors (Sterck and Bouckaert, 2006). The International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions, INTOSAI, which issues the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions, ISSAIs, has 
also remarked that available legislative instruments establishing the IAU in the public sector gives the function a 
legal protection and enhances its independence (INTOSAI, 2010).  
It is expected that the IAUs provide accurate and unbiased information on the judicious use of public resources. 
Best practice demands that the IAU should have a dual reporting relationship in an organisation in an attempt to 
maintain independence. Attribute standard 1110 foresaw the relevance of this function and has stipulated that in the 
pursuit to maintain the independence of the IAU, the CAE should report functionally to the board or the AC and 
administratively to the Chief executive officer. Because the public sector auditor’s role is to provide unbiased and 
accurate information on the use of public resources, auditors must be able to conduct and report on their work 
without interference or the appearance of interference. Oyerogba et al. (2014) conducted a study on the reporting 
independence of IAUs among the Nigerian public sector organisations. The results suggest that the IAUs maintain a 
reporting independence in the Nigerian public sector organisations. Erasmus and Coetzee (2009) in a study on IAUs 
in South Africa concluded that to adhere to best practice, the IAUs should report functionally or operationally to their 
AC and administratively to the CEOs. This posture is also upheld in by the professional bodies (IIA, 2004; IIA, 
2012). Contrary to the benefits of functional reporting to the AC, Norman et al. (2010) in their study found that some 
CAE perceive personal threats to their job security when they report directly to the AC. Indeed, there are behavioural 
issues that accompany the dual reporting functions of the IAUs.  
Besides the above mentioned organizational factors which impacts on the independence in appearance of the 
IAUs, the existence of the AC also strengthens the independence of the IAUs. The IAUs are expected as discussed 
above to report functionally to the AC. Previous studies have demonstrated that where the IAUs report functionally 
to the AC, the independence of the IAUs is enhanced by the presence of a strong, independent audit committee and 
the freedom to act objectively on audit examination (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Gray and Manson, 2001; Rittengberg 
and Schweiger, 2001; Christopher et al., 2009; Muqattash, 2013). The AC and the IAU as elements of the corporate 
governance process complement each other (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; IIA, 2009). The role of the AC continues to 
evolve as a result of the passage of the SOX (2002) in the U.S.A. The AC can reduce management pressure and 
demonstrate support for the IAU by ensuring that the head of the IAU is not penalised as a consequence of audit 
which reflect unfavorably on management. Studies have revealed that the existence of the AC helps to maintain the 
independence of the IAU from management pressures (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004; Ahmad et al., 2009).  
The increasing need for good corporate governance coupled with legislation such as the SOX have expanded the 
responsibilities of AC (Bronson et al., 2009) beyond their oversight responsibilities of assurance to include 
governance, risk assessment and management, compliance with regulatory and ethical issues. Professional bodies 







and academic researchers have remarked that the AC as sub-group of the BOD should give approval to the 
appointment, dismissal and remuneration of the CAE (IIA, 2004; Alktani and Ghareeb, 2014). In Ghana, the attempt 
to safeguard the independence of the IAUs in particular is underscored by Section 19 of the Internal Audit Agency 
Act, 2003, (Act 658). The Auditor-General in Ghana is mandated by articles 187,188 and 189 of the 1992 
constitution of the Republic of Ghana to undertake internal auditing in the public sector. Prior to the constitutional 
provisions giving recognition to the internal auditing in the public sector organisations in Ghana, internal auditing of 
public sector organisations in Ghana derived its authority from the Audit Service Decree, 1972 (NRCD49) and later 
specific provisions of the Financial Administration Decree, 1979 (SMCD221). When the Audit Service Act 2000, 
Act 584 was enacted, it repealed the Audit Service Decree, 1972 (NRCD49) and part V of the Financial 
Administration Decree, 1979. The Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act 654) in Section 44 Sub-section (I) 
empowered the IAUs of public corporations to audit the accounts of their respective departments corporations in 
accordance with Act 584 and regulations made under the Act. The act that expressly establishes the internal auditing 
in Ghanaian public sector organisations is the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 (Act 658). Section 16(I) of Act 658 
states that public sector organisations shall have an IAUs. 
In Ghana, the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) in section 30(1) requires the establishment of an Audit Report 
Implementation Committee (ARIC) which has the semblance of the AC. Section 30(2a) of Act 584 empowers the 
ARIC to implement all matters raised in audit reports.  
 
3. Methodology 
The population of this study comprises all the Directors of Audit (DOA) in the ten (10) Ghanaian polytechnics. 
The researchers employed the non-probabilistic sampling technique, specifically purposive sampling in selecting the 
ten (10) polytechnics. The DOA were selected because the researchers believed that these personnel are reasonably 
positioned and informed to provide relevant and reliable information on the internal audit activities in the individual 
polytechnics. The researchers personally travelled to five (5) out of the ten (10) polytechnics and employed the 
assistant of contemporaries in the other polytechnics to obtain the data. Permission was sought with the individual 
Rectors of the individual polytechnics and where they were not available the Vice Rectors were contacted. Four (4)  
Rectors and three (3) Vice Rectors provided the permission needed. The purpose of the study was explained to the 
authorities and anonymity of each individual polytechnic response assured. The researchers adopted a qualitative 
research approach in collecting data for this paper using a semi-structured interview guide. The qualitative research 
approach was employed as opposed to a quantitative research approach because the researchers desired to report on a 
phenomenon, the independence in appearance of IAUs in Ghanaian Polytechnics. The semi-structured interview 
guide was employed in this study to allow the respondents ample opportunity to express themselves within the 
confines of the purpose of the study. The research instruments were pretested among internal auditors of the Ghana 
Audit Service, Koforidua through a pilot study in order to ensure the questions were simple, straightforward and 
unambiguous. Constructive feedback was received and appropriate modifications incorporated into the research 
instruments. The data was collected within a period of four (4) weeks. Data from the interview was analysed and 
presented descriptively to offer a detail and rich explanation of the existing phenomenon.  
 
3.1. Findings and Discussion 
Out of ten (10) DOA who were to provide data for this study, seven (7) of them were available constituting 70% 
response rate. In assessing the organizational status of the IAUs in the individual polytechnics, the researchers sought 
information from the respondents on their individual organizational positioning and benchmarked the responses in 
comparison with the international best practice requirements as stipulated by the IIA. Practice Advisory 1100-1, 
captioned independence and objectivity, of the IIA stipulates that the independence of the IAUs is achieved through 
the organizational status of the IAUs. Practice Advisory 1000-1, captioned organizational independence, supports the 
organizational independence of the IAUs by demanding that the organizational position of the IAUs should be 
appropriately defined and documented in an internal audit charter approved by the board of directors. The 
respondents (DOA) mentioned that the IAUs are positioned administratively under the Rectors who are equivalent to 
the chief executive officers (CEOs) in corporate organisations. The respondents also indicated that their position and 
authority is supported by the internal audit charters which have been duly approved by their respective board of 
directors (BOD). The IAUs are not placed under the finance departments nor do they report to the directors of 
finance (DOF). In relation to the organizational status of the IAUs, the researchers sought to ascertain whether the 
IAUs are restricted in the performance of their day to day function. All the respondents revealed that that there are no 
restrictions placed on their work by management, however, one of the DOA remarked that there are occasions when 
the necessary cooperation from management was lacking for them to perform their function effectively 
Respondents were asked to indicate their reporting line in the individual polytechnics. In assessing the 
independence in appearance of the IAUs within the framework of their reporting line, the researchers benchmarked 
the respondents’ responses in comparison with the international best practices as stipulated by the IIA. Practice 
Advisory 1110-2, captioned CAE reporting lines, states that the CAE should report to a (higher) level within the 
organization that will give it the leverage to achieve its responsibility. This reporting line is achieved when the IAUs 
report administratively to the CEO and functionally to the BOD or its equivalent agency the AC. The responses 
obtained from the DOA from the individual polytechnics indicate that the IAUs submit their audit reports 
functionally to the ARIC and administratively to the Rectors. This finding is consistent with the result of (Godwin, 
2004; Oyerogba et al., 2014) that IAUs in public sector organisations report to higher levels. The administrative 
reporting relationship relates to the IAU reporting to the management of an institution for the purpose of day-to-day 
administration such as budgeting and management accounting, human resource administration and internal policies 
and procedure administration. A functional reporting line is a principal indicator of the IAU independence. It 
encompasses functions such as the AC approving the internal audit charter; the approval of the appointment, removal 







and the annual compensation of the CAE by the AC; private meetings between the DOA and the AC and the 
approval of the internal audit risk of the organization by the AC. 
In order to assess the independence in appearance of the IAU within the framework of the powers conferred on 
the AC, the researchers benchmarked the respondents’ responses in line with international best practice and 
legislative acts in Ghana. According to section 30(1) of the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) all the public sector 
institutions subject to auditing by the Auditor General of Ghana are to set up an Audit Report Implementation 
Committee (ARIC) to ensure the implementation of the recommendations of audit reports. Section 16(8) of the 
Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 (Act 658) complements section 30(1) of Act 584 and stipulates the establishment of 
ARICs in public sector organisations. By inference to sections 30(1) of Act 584 and sections 16(8) of Act 658, the 
ARIC is empowered to act fundamentally only as an implementation body of audit reports.  An apparent functional 
gap in the two acts mentioned above is which audit report is the ARIC expected to implement. Is it the audit report of 
the external auditor or the internal auditor? By inference, one can reasonably posit that the ARIC in Ghana is only an 
audit report implementation committee. The acts do not appear to cloth the AC with sufficient coercive powers to act 
independently and effectively with the powers conferred on functional reporting relationship as it relates to the AC 
and the ARIC as reported above.  The framework for professional practice of Internal Auditing issued by the IIA also 
requires organisations to have an independent and effective Audit Committees. All the respondents revealed that 
their individual institutions had established the ARIC as stipulated by the relevant sections Acts 584 and Act 652.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The study sought to examine the independence in appearance of IAUs in Ghanaian polytechnics. The concept of 
auditor independence in appearance was examined against the framework of organisational status of the IAUs, the 
IAUs’ reporting line to the BOD or the AC and the powers conferred on the AC in Ghanaian polytechnics.   
The study suggests that there exist IAUs in each the Ghanaian polytechnics which are appropriately positioned 
under the Rectors, the higher level authority, in Ghanaian polytechnics. The IAUs derive their mandate from an act 
of Ghana’s parliament.  In addition, the organizational status of the IAUs in the individual polytechnics is anchored 
and empowered in an internal audit charter approved by the individual BOD. Of the seven (7) DOA, who 
participated in this study, all of them reported that to a large extent there are no restrictions  placed upon their scope 
of work. This position is consistent with international best practice for promoting organisational independence of the 
IAU. The study suggests that the IAUs in Ghanaian polytechnics report functionally to the AC and administratively 
to the Rectors (CEOs) of the individual polytechnics. This posture is consistent with international best practice and 
contemporary research findings in promoting the independence of the IAU. Finally, the study suggests that there 
exist AC in each of the individual polytechnics mandated by an act of Ghana’s parliament with the principal 
responsibility of implementing audit reports. The study evidence suggests that the IAUs in the Ghanaian 
Polytechnics to a large extent are independent in appearance. However, a sober consideration of the scope and 
responsibility of the AC (ARIC) in Ghanaian polytechnics indicates that the responsibility of the ARIC is restricted 
only to an audit report implementation committee. In making generalizations about this study, the following 
limitations are noteworthy: 
The study did not examine the independence in fact of the IAUs since this will relate more to the personal 
objectivity of the DOA of the individual Ghanaian polytechnics. The study did not consider the composition, 
qualification and meeting frequencies of the individual AC. The study results relied largely on self- reports made by 
the individual DOA which might have some elements of subjectivity. The study did not consider the view of other 
staff of the individual polytechnics in examining the independence in appearance of the IAUs. 
Future research can explore the competences of the members of the AC and the qualifications of the DOA who 
head the individual IAUs. The scope and responsibility of the ARIC in the various laws such as the Audit Service 
Act, 2000 (Act 584), and the Internal Audit Agency Act 2003 (Act 658) must be reviewed. Currently the ARIC is 
recognized only as an implementation body. The various acts, enabling the scope and responsibility of the ARIC 
must empower the public sector AC to be more assertive in their function so as to strengthen the independence of 
IAUs in the Ghanaian public sector domain.  
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